The Cathedral Through the Looking Glass: A Commentary on Dagan and Dorfman\u27s Just Relationships by Zipursky, Benjamin C.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2017
The Cathedral Through the Looking Glass: A
Commentary on Dagan and Dorfman's Just
Relationships
Benjamin c. Zipursky
Fordham University School of Law, bzipursky@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benjamin c. Zipursky, The Cathedral Through the Looking Glass: A Commentary on Dagan and Dorfman's Just Relationships, 117 Colum.
L. Rev. Online 165 (2017)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/895
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE 
VOL. 117 JUNE 6, 2017 PAGES 165–178 
 165
THE CATHEDRAL THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: 
A COMMENTARY ON DAGAN AND DORFMAN’S JUST 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Benjamin C. Zipursky∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In their edifying and ambitious recent article Just Relationships, 
Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman suggest that everyone 
before them has erred in their account of the distinction between public 
law and private law.1 Classic liberal scholars—a category meant to cover 
Thomas Hobbes and William Blackstone through the nineteenth century 
to Richard Epstein,2 Ernest Weinrib,3 and Arthur Ripstein4—endorse a 
prepolitical conception of rights and then treat private law as clarifying 
and concretizing that domain; clarity of enforceability of rights permits 
freedom and recognizes equality. Conversely, realists and instrumentalist 
scholars—typiﬁed by the law and economics school—do not really think 
there is a distinction between private law and public law; private law is 
just public law in disguise.5 The legal system creates legal entitlements 
and rules enforcing them in order to serve important public beneﬁts in 
the long run.6 
Both sides are wrong, Dagan and Dorfman tell us. Classic liberals are 
wrong in thinking there is a domain of prepolitical rights and private law 
preserves this domain thorugh special juridical forms. Instrumentalists 
are mistaken in rejecting the public–private distinction altogether. Dagan 
and Dorfman put forward the best of both worlds in their “just 
relationships” theory. They tell us that private law is distinctive 
because it focuses on the relations between private people as free 
and equal persons (while public law—such as constitutional law—is 
essentially about the state’s relation to individuals and the regulation 
                                                                                                                           
∗.  Professor of Law and James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law 
School. Thanks to John Goldberg for helpful comments on an earlier draft and to 
Professors Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman for being great interlocutors. 
 1. Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 
(2016). 
 2. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973). 
 3. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995). 
 4. Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (2016) [hereinafter Ripstein, Private Wrongs]. 
 5. Leon Green, Tort Law as Public Law in Disguise, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1959). 
 6. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1410 (arguing lawyer-economists “see 
private law as just another means to serve our public goals”). 
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of individual interactions7). Yet private law is not derived from 
individualistic, mutually independent persons having their own 
prepolitical domain of entitlements. To the contrary, it is a normative 
legal scheme that the state puts forward for public-law-like reasons: to 
enhance human liberty, equality, and ﬂourishing in a world of 
interdependent persons. 
Traveling from moral and political theory to black letter law, 
Dagan and Dorfman focus on cases from tort, contract, property, 
and restitution to make their point. They offer the variability of the 
standard of care,8 incompetence and unconscionability,9 mistaken 
payment,10 and numerous other doctrines to explain the sense in 
which private law is already engaged in the enterprise of defining the 
realm of horizontal rights and duties for a substantively free and equal 
society. 
In a number of ways, I am sympathetic to Dagan and Dorfman’s 
project. Indeed, over the past twenty years, Professor John Goldberg and 
I have devoted much of our energy to displaying tort law as a domain of 
relational duties among private parties, and, unlike some of those whom 
Dagan and Dorfman criticize, our model is substantive rather than 
formal.11 Like Dagan and Dorfman, we have rejected both corrective 
justice theory and instrumentalism. And, like them, we have recognized 
both the possibility and the importance of designing schemes of rights 
and duties that answer to substantive values.12 
Nevertheless, there is plenty in Dagan and Dorfman’s Just 
Relationships with which I disagree as a matter of legal theory and as a 
matter of law. Disagreements tend to provide more engaging reading 
than incessant head-nodding, so Part I will set forth objections to a 
variety of medium-sized claims in their paper. Part II articulates my 
reasons for rejecting what I refer to as their taxonomic claim: the claim 
that private law is best understood as an effort by our political system to set out 
just terms of interaction between private parties. In Part III, however, I step 
back from my negativity and offer a reconception of their article as a 
transformation of the standing, realist view of private law set forth in 
                                                                                                                           
 7. Id. at 1397 (noting “public law . . . governs our interactions as patients of the 
welfare state or as citizens of a democracy”). 
 8. Id. at 1431–35. 
 9. Id. at 1425–26. 
 10. Id. at 1456–57. 
 11. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 Tex. L. 
Rev. 917 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 
51 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse]. 
 12. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Oxford Introductions 
to U.S. Law: Torts 27–45 (2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Oxford Introductions]. 
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Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s classic Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.13 
I. PROBLEMS WITH SETUP AND EVIDENCE 
First and foremost, Dagan and Dorfman’s setup is exaggerated in 
ways that will matter to their targets. Let’s start with the classic liberals. To 
be sure, there is some resemblance between Epstein’s Lockean view and 
Ripstein’s Kantian view; each is willing to be grouped with a corrective 
justice theorist and each is committed to a rights-based conception of 
private law.14 But on crucial issues, Epstein and Ripstein are diametrically 
opposed in ways that run contrary to what Dagan and Dorfman say. In 
particular, Ripstein could not be clearer in rejecting a view that Dagan and 
Dorfman claim is central to him: Private law involves state enforcement 
of “prepolitical or apolitical interactions.”15 For Ripstein, the role of the 
state in articulating rights goes all the way down; there are rights only 
because there is a state.16 In this sense, rights are intrinsically 
postpolitical. Relatedly, nothing in Ripstein’s view precludes the existence 
of legislative measures that are aimed in a Razian, perfectionistic 
direction of the sort Dagan and Dorfman suggest. Ripstein has no reason 
to reject, for example, the sorts of worker protection we see in mandatory 
workers’ compensation laws. He would view this as public law playing a 
role in spelling out the fuller state of what background justice requires 
for individuals in a particular legal community.17 
In addition, Dagan and Dorfman exaggerate their description of law 
and economics on the public–private distinction in problematic ways. It 
is true, as they claim, that many realists and instrumentalists essentially 
denied the public–private distinction altogether.18 But law-and-economics 
scholars like Coase, Calabresi, and Posner are in a somewhat different 
place. They do think that courts and legislators need to design contract, 
property, and tort law in a manner that maximizes overall wealth or 
                                                                                                                           
 13. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1104–05 (1972). 
 14. See Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 6–8 (emphasizing a rights-based 
approach and recognizing the superiority of the Weinribian corrective justice approach 
over instrumentalism); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict 
Liability in Context, 3 J. Tort L., no. 1, 2010, art. 6, at 3–4 (recognizing himself among 
corrective justice theorists, but emphasizing differences in approach). 
 15. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397. 
 16. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Theory 145–81 
(2009) (explaining that, on the Kantian view, rights require the institutionalization and 
enforceability provided by the state). 
 17. See id. at 267–99; Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 292–93 (discussing 
workers’ compensation). 
 18. See, e.g., Green, supra note 5. 
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minimizes overall cost.19 Yet it is misleading to say that they merely efface 
the public–private distinction. In different ways and to different degrees, 
all three thinkers conceive of private law as a means whereby wealth can 
be maximized with relatively minimal top-down control. With privately 
allocated entitlements plus a set of property rules, liability rules, and 
mechanisms for transactions, private actors in a market economy can 
pursue individual preference satisfaction while simultaneously expanding 
overall wealth. Private law constitutes a distinctive means by which social 
welfare moves forward. And, in different ways as to Calabresi, Coase, and 
Posner (and the intellectual movement of law and economics generally) 
there is a Hayek-inspired admiration for the liberty-enhancing capacity of 
private law. 
Dagan and Dorfman must sharpen their critical points if they want 
to lift their view above their adversaries’. Their actual point is that these 
other theorists are too narrow in their vision of the value of tort, 
contract, property, and restitution, and this narrowness stems from a 
cramped view of the public–private distinction. If we adopt Dagan and 
Dorfman’s account of the public–private distinction, which is attractive 
for independent reasons, we will see that these areas of law typically 
described as “private law” in fact have the capacity to help realize a fuller 
sense of liberty and equality. On the liberal view that enshrines the 
public–private distinction, the achievement of private law is simply to 
safeguard liberty conceived of as a capacity for independent choice and 
equality conceived of formally.20 On the instrumentalist view that 
recognizes all law aims as public ends, private law manages to structure 
private entitlements so that private actors fortuitously achieve more 
welfare-enhancing results.21 
Dagan and Dorfman invite us to regard private law as the law 
governing interactions between private persons (or entities), and, more 
generally, as the law specifying the rights and duties as between private 
parties. Once we see the domain of private law in this light, then it is 
natural to ask: What is the proper allocation of rights and duties between 
persons? We cannot answer this question until we get a grip on core values 
from a moral and political point of view. Dagan and Dorfman argue that 
a legal system and political system like ours is obligated to design 
political and legal structures so as to enhance the opportunity for 
individuals to ﬂourish as autonomous beings, setting their own ends and 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987); R. H. Coase, The Problem 
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
 
 20. Ripstein, Private Wrongs, supra note 4, at 51 (private law protects “the capacity of 
each person to set and pursue his or her own purposes”). 
 21. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13. 
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values within the context of just relationships.22 Somewhat ironically, they 
have really borrowed from each of their (polar opposite) antagonists: 
from the corrective-justice theorists, the insistence on correlative rights 
and duties as essential to private law, which safeguards genuine individual 
autonomy, and from the instrumentalists, the willingness to use these 
private law structures as means of pursuing overall social goals. Their 
general point, in the doctrinal section of the article, is to show that 
“private law casts (as it should) interpersonal interactions as frameworks 
of relationships between self-determining individuals who respect each 
other as the persons they actually are.”23 
At least with regard to their principal torts example, Dagan and 
Dorfman’s doctrinal discussion is problematic. Their basic claim is that 
the standard of care in negligence law is sensitive to the disabilities of a 
potential victim.24 In the context of considering a mentally disabled 
person “who is hit by a car while crossing the street,” they state that the 
victim’s disability can count in two ways.25 First, it can bear on “the 
contents of the duty of care owed by the potential injurer” whether the 
victim was mentally disabled (and responded as a mentally disabled 
person as the car approached her).26 Second, “the victim’s disability may, 
under the doctrine of comparative negligence,” alter the negligence 
attributable to the victim and correspondingly alter the apportionment 
of liability to the injurer.27 
Dagan and Dorfman’s read of negligence law on breach is 
importantly different than my own and, indeed, is inconsistent with that 
of most American jurisdictions and tort scholars. It is true that juries 
must consider whether the defendant conducted herself as a reasonably 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances,28 and perhaps it 
is true that circumstances will sometimes allow mental disabilities to 
enter the analysis implicitly.29 And it is true that certain kinds of 
demonstrable physical disabilities, such as blindness, will alter the 
applicable standard of care for both injurers and victims.30 But, in 
conﬂict with Dagan and Dorfman’s characterization, negligence law 
famously and overwhelmingly utilizes an objective standard of care that is 
                                                                                                                           
 22. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1412 (arguing that “private law’s rights, 
obligations, and frameworks structure the pursuit of ends in a relational way”). 
 23. Id. at 1433. 
 24. Id. at 1431. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1999, 2014 
(2007). 
 29. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 11 
cmt. e (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (noting “[t]here are, moreover, circumstances in addition 
to apportionment that warrant taking actor’s emotional disorders into account”). 
 30. See id. § 11 cmt. b. 
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insensitive to differences in the mental capacities of defendants.31 As 
indicated in the Second and Third Restatements of Torts, the objectivity 
of the standard of care—including its insensitivity to mental disabilities of 
adults—is one of the most striking features of negligence law, and it 
generally applies both as to injurers and as to victims.32 While it may be 
the case that the modern trend is toward a more ﬂexible view as to 
mental capacities and victims’ negligence,33 this—like the prior 
exceptions—is but another wild rose in a ﬁeld of dandelions.34 
II. TROUBLES WITH TAXONOMY 
My central objection pertains to Dagan and Dorfman’s taxonomic 
aspirations. Preliminarily, it will be useful to separate three claims: their 
taxonomic claim, their analytic claim, and their evaluative claim (my 
distinctions and labels, not theirs). 
The taxonomic claim (most concisely expressed in their second 
footnote): “[P]rivate law establishes the rights and duties individuals 
have as against one another; public law, in contrast, pertains to 
individuals’ rights and duties as citizens or vis-à-vis the collective state at 
large.”35 
The analytic claim: Private law constructs “frameworks of respectful 
interaction—of just relationships—among genuinely free and equal 
individuals.”36 
The evaluative claim: Private law’s construction of just relationships 
renders it intrinsically valuable.37 
                                                                                                                           
 31. See id. § 11 cmt. e (noting that, for adults but not children, a mental or emotional 
disability “is typically disregarded in considering whether the person has exercised reasonable 
care” and that “[t]his is the position taken by the Restatement Second of Torts § 283B, and . . . 
is supported by a consistent line of modern cases”). 
 32. Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
 33. See, e.g., Barry E. Lindahl, 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:64 (2d 
ed. & Supp. 2016). As the Restatement (Second) points out, however, total insanity is quite 
different from a lesser form of mental disability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B 
cmt. c. 
 34. For their assertion that injurers’ standard of care varies with the mental capacity 
of the potential victim, Dagan and Dorfman rely in part on Campbell v. Cluster Housing 
Development Fund Co., 668 N.Y.S.2d 634, 635 (App. Div. 1998). See Dagan & Dorfman, 
supra note 1, at 1432 n.161. They fail to recognize, however, that the defendant’s duty of 
care with regard to the plaintiff in that case was the affirmative duty of a half-way house to 
protect the plaintiff. The breach standard in the case of an affirmative duty of an 
institution to a person institutionalized is of course different from the breach standard 
among strangers in misfeasance cases. 
 35. Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397 n.2. 
 36. Id. at 1397. 
 37. Id. (“Yet private law is valuable beyond its contingent, external beneﬁts: It is 
intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic value of private law lies in its construction of 
frameworks of respectful interaction—of just relationships—among genuinely free and 
equal individuals.”). 
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The question of whether private law constructs frameworks of respectful 
interaction is distinct from the questions of: (a) whether that is the only or 
at least the principal thing that private law does, (b) whether doing so 
falls outside of the range of things that public law does, and (c) whether 
private law’s constructing frameworks of respectful interaction is part of what it 
is to be private law. Similarly, the question of whether private law’s 
construction of frameworks of respectful interaction (assuming it does construct 
such frameworks) renders it intrinsically valuable is distinct from the 
questions of: (d) whether private law’s construction of frameworks of 
respectful interaction is the only thing about private law that renders it 
intrinsically valuable, and (e) whether the (putative) truth that private 
law’s construction of frameworks of respectful interaction renders private 
law intrinsically valuable is what makes private law intrinsically valuable, 
qua private law. 
My overall contention is that even if Dagan and Dorfman’s analytic 
and evaluative claims are true, the answers to (a)–(e) are all negative, 
and therefore their taxonomic claim is false. 
The easiest way for me to motivate the analytic claim is, for better or 
worse, to begin with my own work, both individually and in combination 
with Professor John Goldberg. In 1998 I published Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts and laid out a view according to which the law 
of torts consists, in signiﬁcant part, of relational norms of conduct.38 I 
claimed, in particular, that tort law includes relational directives such as: 
For all X, for all Y, X shall not batter Y. Or, for another example: For all 
X, for all Y, if X is a physician and Y is a patient of X, then X shall not 
injure Y through medical malpractice.39 These relational norms of 
conduct simultaneously impose duties to treat people in certain ways and 
establish rights to be treated in certain ways.40 In a very straightforward 
sense, then, I asserted that much of tort law consists of norms of 
interaction. 
It is easy to see how such a model might be carried over to contract; 
doing so involves asserting a basic norm of keeping one’s obligation: For 
all X, for all Y, if X formed a contractual obligation to Y to do A, X shall 
do A. And, if along with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, we understand 
property as involving simultaneous multital rights,41 and we understand 
those rights to be universal bilateral rights, then we have a basis for 
including this within property, too. It is possible that restitution will ﬂow 
from an understanding of property rights. 
If this were so, then it would be plausible to assert that tort, contract, 
and property law all involve relational norms of conduct, which confer 
                                                                                                                           
 38. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 11, at 59–70. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 719 (1917). 
172 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117:165 
 
rights and duties among private parties. This is roughly the same as 
Dagan and Dorfman’s analytic claim.42 Moreover, Dagan and Dorfman 
plausibly suggest (and I, along with Professor Goldberg, have suggested) 
that the construction and enforcement of relational norms of conduct is 
an irreducibly important part of what tort law does.43 By parity of 
reasoning, one might argue that the same is true of property and 
contract. If so, then we are brought roughly to Dagan and Dorfman’s 
evaluative claim. Dagan and Dorfman go further, however: Seeing tort, 
contract, and property as all parts of private law, they conclude that 
schemes of relational duty lie at the essence of private law, while 
schemes of duty to the state relate to public law.44 That is their 
taxonomic claim. Here are my concerns with it: 
(a′) Private law does much more than construct relational norms of 
conduct. Contract empowers people to come together for exchanges. 
Property law allows for transfer of property. Corporate law creates private 
entities with a variety of powers, rights, and duties. H.L.A. Hart’s The 
Concept of Law famously discusses the basic point: Legal rules do not only 
impose duties; they also create legal powers of various forms.45 Surely, 
private law—with powers to sue, powers to contract, and powers to 
transfer—is far more than duty-imposing norms of conduct. 
(b′) Much of what is uncontroversially public law rather than private 
law creates relational norms of conduct between private parties. It is not 
just the criminal law with its relational norms regarding theft, sexual 
assault, and homicide. It is also innumerable statutes and regulations 
governing employers and employees, strangers who may not eavesdrop 
upon one another, commercial sellers and their representations to 
consumers, landlord–tenant relations, and on and on and on. These are 
all about rights and duties, but they are paradigmatic of public law. 
                                                                                                                           
 42. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397. 
 43. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, Oxford Introductions, supra note 12, at 60–62. 
 44. Dagan and Dorfman are ambiguous about the degree to which their conception 
of the private–public distinction differs from the classical liberal conception principally on 
the nature of private law, rather than on the nature of public law, as well. At some points in 
the text, it appears that they favor a different conception of public law, too: “[P]ublic 
law . . . governs our interactions as patients of the welfare state or as citizens of a democracy.” 
Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1397 (emphasis added). The suggestion that public law 
is about individuals’ interactions and that it is intrinsically tied to the existence of a welfare state or a 
democracy appears to convey a view narrower and more particularized than the vertical, 
individual-state view, as traditionally conceived by classic liberals (not to mention 
libertarians). However—apart from the fact that this appears untenably narrow on many 
levels—Dagan and Dorfman’s footnote to that passage reverts to a more familiar 
conception of public law, indicating that the article really is more about reconceptualizing 
private law than public law: “Put another way, private law establishes the rights and duties 
individuals have against one another; public law, in contrast, pertains to individuals’ rights 
and duties as citizens or vis-à-vis the collective state at large.” Id. at 1397 n.2. 
 45. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012). 
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(c′) Even if we were to accept that each ﬁeld of private law (e.g., tort, 
contract) creates and enforces relational directives, it does not follow 
that creating and enforcing relational directives is part of being private law. 
Every living person with a disability has a circulatory system, but it would 
be misleading to say that part of being a disabled person is having a 
circulatory system. If we want to know what is distinctive about private 
law, we must be picking out something that is not true of areas of public 
law or perhaps only true in odd and uncharacteristic domains of public 
law. Or at least, we must ﬁnd that—as opposed to public law areas—
relational directives, relational duties, and rights are all that constitute 
private law. Statement (b′) above shows that the ﬁrst disjunct is false: 
Many areas of public law are ﬁlled with relational duties. Statement (a′) 
shows that the second disjunct is also false: Many areas of private law do 
much more, like empowering private parties to transfer assets, to bring 
lawsuits, to form joint enterprises, and so on. For all of these reasons, 
Dagan and Dorfman’s taxonomic claim is unsustainable. 
It remains an open question whether recognizing rights and duties 
between parties and regulating “just relationships” are (d) the only 
things about private law that render it intrinsically valuable, and 
therefore whether (e) the attributes of recognizing rights and duties 
between parties and regulating “just relationships” are what make private 
law intrinsically valuable, qua private law. It should now be clear that in 
order for this to be so, the other things done by private law, if valuable at 
all, could not be intrinsically valuable. Presumably, that would mean they 
are instrumentally valuable—instrumental in enforcing the relational 
duties and rights and perhaps instrumental in permitting individuals to 
satisfy their various desires and reach their various goals. Of course, 
although I accept that part of the value of, for example, the power to 
bring a lawsuit is that the social beneﬁts of having relational directives 
are realized through their enforceability, I categorically reject the claim 
that the value of private powers is entirely derivative or instrumental. 
Part of the value of tort law is that it provides individuals with an 
avenue of civil redress against their wrongdoers. One might view such 
individuals—as in the case of private rights of action under RICO or the 
Clayton Act—as acting in part in a private attorney general role.46 That is, 
essentially, what Posner has asserted about tort law.47 I have argued that 
this would be to miss what is especially private about tort law. The locus 
of power is in the individual, and the individual claims the right to have 
                                                                                                                           
 46. See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (noting both RICO and the 
Clayton Act “share a common congressional objective of encouraging civil litigation 
to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize the respectively prohibited 
practices”). 
 47. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence Law, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 48–49 
(1972) (describing the efficiency of an individualized, victim-driven enforcement system). 
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such a power.48 This may not be the most effective way to see that rights 
and duties are generally enjoyed, and it certainly might not be the way to 
see that an individual’s rights are most effectively protected—for 
example, criminal law and prosecutorial enforcement may be a more 
effective means than tort in protecting a woman’s rights as against her 
abusive spouse. Yet as a matter of the right of individuals to act self-
protectively and to act self-restoringly, and as a matter of equalizing 
power, each individual has a claim against the state to authenticate and 
enforce her demands against those who have wronged her.49 Hence, tort 
law is a marriage of relational directives to private rights of action. 
Contract and property are in many ways equally clear. Contracts 
could exist if the state went around sua sponte enforcing them. That is 
not our system. Ours empowers individuals with private powers to 
demand performance or its equivalent.50 This means that some primary 
conduct will be forthcoming. These are not simply random choices of to 
whom the state gives the power; the power is provided to the plaintiff 
because the plaintiff is entitled to make an authentic demand for 
compliance with an obligation.51 More striking, still, in contract, is the 
private power to bind oneself and to bind one another. As the classic 
liberals have rightly explained, part of having the power is having 
autonomy. But this is hardly to say that the power is instrumental. The 
autonomy, in the state, is partly constituted by these powers. 
III. RECONSTRUCTION (OR THE CATHEDRAL THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS) 
Elsewhere, I have supplied my own version of a taxonomic claim: 
Private law areas all prominently feature power-conferring rules that 
confer powers on individuals and private entities, while public law areas 
all prominently feature power-conferring rules that confer powers (and 
limit powers) on public entities, such as sovereigns, government 
agencies, courts, and legislatures.52 Individual areas such as tort law or 
constitutional law are not necessarily constituted by the features that 
render them part of private or public law, just as human beings are not 
                                                                                                                           
 48. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1757, 1769–71 (2012) (explaining that tort law empowers a plaintiff to exact a 
remedy in order to redress a wrong done speciﬁcally to her). 
 49. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibilities in the 
Law of Torts, in Rights in Private Law 251, 265–70 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 
2012). 
 50. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse and the Plurality of Wrongs, 
2014 N.Z. L. Rev. 145 (analyzing diverse areas of private law in terms of the powers they 
provide individuals). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 623, 649–51 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
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necessarily constituted by being both bipeds and featherless. Certainly, 
tort law can do things—deter harmful conduct, compensate the 
injured—that are frequently associated with areas of public law. And part 
of what one would ﬁnd in a constitutional law treatise, e.g., Bivens53 
claims, might well involve the empowerment of private parties.54 
A fuller defense and development of my taxonomic account would 
go beyond the scope of this commentary, but such development seems 
unnecessary. This is because Dagan and Dorfman’s focus on recreating 
the public–private law distinction is a distraction from Just Relationships’s 
key contribution. Whether Dagan and Dorfman realize it or not, Just 
Relationships puts forth a much larger, more provocative, and more 
important goal—a goal that Dagan and Dorfman have a serious shot at 
realizing. Clarifying their real goal will require a return to the distinction 
between classic liberal private law theorists and the instrumentalists and 
realists. 
As Dagan and Dorfman see it, the classic liberal view combines an 
emphasis on individual freedom and equality as core values of areas like 
tort, contract, and property with an assertion that the legal framework of 
private law must be formal rather than material in order to protect 
freedom. This, according to Dagan and Dorfman, leads to a sharp 
distinction between private law (which is formal and freedom-protecting) 
and public law (which is material and welfare-seeking). By contrast, 
instrumentalists and realists combine the view that private law’s crucial 
contribution is delivering better material conditions—as opposed to 
freedom and equality—with a skepticism of the putatively intimate 
connection between legal formalities and substantive normative values. 
This leads to an evisceration of the distinction between public and 
private law. 
Dagan and Dorfman’s announced plan is to combine the classic 
liberal’s recognition of freedom and equality as core values of private law 
and recognition of a private law–public law distinction with the realist’s 
embrace of the goals of bettering material conditions as a crucial 
deliverable of private law areas and the corresponding skepticism of the 
intrinsic importance of formalities of private law. They believe that by 
putting forward a horizontal conception of private law, they can rescue a 
version of the private–public distinction since they regard public law as 
vertical, not horizontal.55 
For the reasons described in Part II, I do not think their account 
rescues the private–public distinction, but my larger point in this section 
                                                                                                                           
 53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
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 54. See, e.g., 1 William J. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law: Liberty and Equality 
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 55. See supra note 44 (characterizing Dagan and Dorfman’s conception of public 
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is that the action in their important article lies in its combination of part 
of the classic liberal account—the insistence that private law secures 
freedom and equality—with another part of the realist account—the 
recognition of the thoroughgoing materiality and nonformality of private 
law. Following Professor Joseph Raz, Professor Elizabeth Anderson, and a 
variety of important contemporary thinkers, Dagan and Dorfman believe 
that a Nozickean or Epsteinian or even Ripsteinian conception of 
freedom and equality in private law is far too narrow.56 Law, including tort 
law, contract law, and property law, plays a crucial role in constructing the 
material and institutional conditions in which interdependent individuals 
can in fact exercise autonomy in building their lives. In particular, 
relational directives in the legal system—and the ongoing adjustment of 
relational directives to contemporary needs and aspirations—are critical 
to the construction of the conditions for freedom and equality. In this 
vein, for example, property law needs to be adapted from its common 
law narrowness to include antidiscrimination in housing norms,57 and 
contract law needs to be adapted to make room for more 
accommodating sorts of employer–employee contracts.58 The conditions 
for individuals to flourish as free and equal require advancement in 
relational legal norms. 
It follows from this view that the formalities of private law, to a great 
extent, are not what gives private law its special value—it is the existence 
of a legally realized web of relational rights and duties. To this extent, 
Dagan and Dorfman share the realist sensibility that private law can and 
should seek results in a pragmatic, real-world fashion. However, the use 
of the private law to reach public goals is not principally welfarist in its 
orientation. To the contrary, the overarching public goal is to create a 
real-world framework for autonomy and ﬂourishing, conceived of 
substantively. That is what the range of relational directives in the law, 
creating rights and duties, is able to do. 
There is a deep sense in which Dagan and Dorfman turn upside down 
today’s conventional version of realist private law theory. Dagan and 
Dorfman do not say enough about what the classic liberal conception of 
private law and the realist–instrumentalist conception share: a sense that 
private law subjects such as tort, contract, and property are about the 
distribution of entitlements. It is of course a distortion to say that scholars 
from Coase to Calabresi conceive of entitlements as “stuff possessed,” for 
each scholar is expansive in recognizing that rights are rights to conduct 
certain activities, and each recognizes that a right of X to do A, as against 
Y’s right of being free from A, does not entail a right of X to do A, as 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 1442 n.203 (citing Elizabeth Anderson, 
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against Z’s right of being free from A. And yet we will see that Dagan and 
Dorfman’s horizontal, “just relationships” conception of private law is 
fundamentally different from an entitlements-based view. 
Under Calabresi and Melamed’s view, we can think of both 
possessions and raw liberties to do various things as a kind of baseline of 
distributions, and then we make a decision about different ways of 
protecting the individual’s possession of that stuff and those liberties: a 
liability rule, a property rule, and an inalienability rule.59 This is not to 
say that they believe these would be legal entitlements without any rule at 
all; they do not. Nonetheless what is in common to the different rules is 
that they all protect entitlements. Different departments of private law 
use different tools, and criminal law uses a different tool still. And the 
different tools will have quite different impacts on overall social welfare. 
The Kantian liberal, like Ripstein, cuts deeper in a way; she sees that the 
notion of having any stuff at all or any domain of liberty is incoherent 
except against a background of private law. The formality of private law is 
needed for there to be freedom and “stuff” at all. Unsurprisingly, given 
the Lockean background of liberalism, there is a property orientation to 
the conception of entitlement at the core of private law theory. 
Dagan and Dorfman are best read, in my view, as challenging the 
entitlement centrism of private law theory in favor of what I regard as a 
relationship-centric view. The rules are not different ways of protecting 
entitlements. There are no prepolitical entitlements, and, what is more, 
there is no prepolitical and nonnormative baseline of “proto-entitlements” 
that the legal system converts into authentic entitlements. The aspiration of 
private law to allow for freedom and equality is not an aspiration to make 
sure we can use our own private stuff to do what we want; it is the 
aspiration to put us into relationships of equality with one another, in a 
system in which we are able to ﬂourish as interdependent beings. Even 
when we are talking about real property, for example, the real property 
exists by virtue of the directives of conduct, requiring that others be 
treated certain ways or that they not be mistreated in certain ways. 
CONCLUSION 
In my view, Dagan and Dorfman’s theory becomes more plausible, 
powerful, and important when one disregards questions about the 
public–private distinction and, instead of beginning with the classic 
liberal, begins with the contemporary realist and instrumentalist. If one is 
a realist enough to sidestep the public–private distinction and to see the 
public-facing aspect of rules of tort, contract, and property, and if one 
wishes to provide a normative framework for evaluating different possible 
rules, the question is what sort of normative framework is appropriate. 
Dagan and Dorfman’s strongest negative point is that there is no reason 
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to assume one must be principally utilitarian or welfarist in selecting a 
normative framework. Then, if we accept political theoretic normative 
arguments for seeking law that will support freedom and equality, we can 
ask whether there is any reason to believe that areas like tort, contract, 
and property relate to the realization of those values. If we understand 
these areas as constituted in part by relational directives of conduct, 
duties, and rights, then of course there is reason for a realist to see the 
potentially pivotal role of such law in protecting freedom and equality. 
There is, then, an irony when we ﬁnally turn back to the classic 
liberal. Both this version of realism and the conceptualism or formalism 
of the classic liberal do rely on the values of freedom and equality. They 
have different conceptions of what freedom and equality require and 
how the law best secures them. But until Dagan and Dorfman’s article, 
private law theory had overwhelmingly placed welfarism along with 
private law realism and instrumentalism, and placed freedom and 
equality as core values within a highly conceptualistic private law theory 
camp. Their important article shows that is a mistake. 
 
